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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum



THE CURRENT STATE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS



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25 February 1971



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 February 1971

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Current State of Sino-Soviet Relations

Political Relations

1. There has been no firm evidence that Moscow has introduced any new proposal at the Peking political talks, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A Soviet China specialist said [REDACTED] that the Peking discussions were "at a standstill" and that the Soviets were awaiting "new initiatives from the Chinese side." [REDACTED] The negative tone of these comments, which is consistent with the reports [REDACTED] since the talks got underway, indicates that no significant progress is being made on the border issue.

Note: This memorandum, the 23rd in a series of bi-weekly reports on Sino-Soviet relations, was prepared jointly by the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of Strategic Research and was coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.

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


2. Moscow has invited the Chinese Communist Party to send representatives to the coming 24th CPSU congress, according to a French press service report attributed to "reliable sources" in Moscow. If such an invitation has been extended, Moscow probably has put it on the record to show its "positive" attitude toward Peking and has little expectation that the Chinese will accept.

Soviet Comments on Chinese UN Representation

3. The Soviet Foreign Ministry [] told US Ambassador Beam on 23 February that it was quite clear China was definitely interested in UN membership. In a possible effort to indicate that Moscow has a unique insight into China's UN policy, he claimed that Peking had "discussed" last year's general assembly session with Moscow. [] said he was "absolutely convinced" that Peking will not abandon its demand that Taiwan be ejected from all UN organs as a condition of membership. Other lower ranking Soviet officials have recently predicted [] that Peking will gain UN admission in either 1971 or 1972. One Soviet UN diplomat this week went further [] he told a US official that Peking would reject UN membership if Taiwan were not expelled from all UN-related agencies as well as UN organs.

4. Comments such as these suggest that Moscow is resigned to Peking's eventual UN membership but may be hoping that Western resistance to Taiwan's

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

expulsion will forestall Chinese admission this year. The diplomats made clear that Moscow will not drop its public--albeit half-hearted--support for Peking's entry and will not join in any Western effort to keep Taiwan in the UN. Moscow remains unhappy with the prospect of China's presence in the UN, however, and may continue to engage in independent, low-key efforts to keep it out.

[REDACTED]

Soviets Seek to Score Points Over Laos

7. The Soviet central media have noted without comment many of the Chinese warnings concerning US and South Vietnamese operations in Laos. Moscow

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has reprinted, for example, Peking's assertions that the operations are "a serious threat to China" and that the Chinese people will not permit their extension to other areas of Indochina.

8. In reprinting the veiled Chinese threats, Moscow appears in part to be trying to fan US apprehension over the possibility of Peking's intervention in the fighting. In addition, Moscow may be trying to suggest a greater coincidence of interest with Peking than actually exists. At the same time, however, Soviet propaganda broadcasts to China and Southeast Asia indicate that Moscow is also bent on utilizing the Laotian developments to reiterate its long-standing condemnation of Peking for failing to take "united socialist action" and to discredit the reliability of Chinese support in the eyes of Asian revolutionaries. Soviet broadcasts, for example, have belittled Chinese statements of concern over Laos as "clamorous anti-imperialist rhetoric" that will not be backed by "real action." Moscow has also charged that Chinese failure to cooperate with other socialist countries in aiding Vietnam has encouraged US "aggressiveness."

9. Moscow, although concerned over the deteriorating situation in Indochina, probably is not displeased with China's current preoccupation with events on its southern border. Indeed, [] states that Finnish Communists--who have a fairly good reading of what is on the Soviet mind--think the USSR now believes that China must mobilize considerable energy and material resources to protect her Southeast Asian flank. The Finns say Moscow believes this will help divert Chinese attention from the USSR. Although some Soviets may hold this view, Moscow would probably not be happy with a Chinese decision to send combat forces to North Vietnam.

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Such a move would, in Soviet eyes, place the Kremlin in the difficult position of having to react to the Chinese ante or see Peking's influence in Hanoi increased at its own expense.

Sino-Soviet Valentine's Day Passes Unacknowledged

10. Both Moscow and Peking once again failed to acknowledge the 14 February anniversary of the signing of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. The treaty, which has nine more years to run, committed each party to provide military aid in the event of attack on the other by "Japan or other states allied with it" (i.e., the US). Both sides undoubtedly consider the treaty a dead letter under present circumstances.

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